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DOWN WITH BRITAIN, AWAY WITH ZIONISM:  
THE ‘CANAANITES’ AND ‘LOHAMEY HERUT  
ISRAEL’ BETWEEN TWO ADVERSARIES 
 
Roman Vater* 
 
ABSTRACT: The imposition of the British Mandate over Palestine in 1922 put the Zionist leadership 
between a rock and a hard place, between its declared allegiance to the idea of Jewish sovereignty and 
the necessity of cooperation with a foreign ruler. Eventually, both Labour and Revisionist Zionism 
accommodated themselves to the new situation and chose a strategic partnership with the British 
Empire. However, dissident opinions within the Revisionist movement were voiced by a group known 
as the Maximalist Revisionists from the early 1930s. This article analyzes the intellectual and political 
development of two Maximalist Revisionists – Yonatan Ratosh and Israel Eldad – tracing their 
gradual shift to anti-Zionist positions. Some questions raised include: when does opposition to Zionist 
politics transform into opposition to Zionist ideology, and what are the implications of such a 
transition for the Israeli political scene after 1948? 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The standard narrative of Israel’s journey to independence goes generally as follows: 
when the British military rule in Palestine was replaced in 1922 with a Mandate of which 
the purpose was to implement the 1917 Balfour Declaration promising support for a 
Jewish ‘national home’, the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine gained a powerful protector. In 
consequence, Zionist politics underwent a serious shift when both the leftist Labour camp, 
led by David Ben-Gurion (1886-1973), and the rightist Revisionist camp, led by Zeev 
(Vladimir) Jabotinsky (1880-1940), threw in their lot with Britain. The idea of the 
‘covenant between the Empire and the Hebrew state’1 became a paradigm for both camps, 
which (temporarily) replaced their demand for a Jewish state with the long-term prospect 
of bringing the Yishuv to qualitative and quantitative supremacy over the Palestinian 
Arabs under the wings of the British Empire. As a scholar of the Yishuv, Yehoshua Porat, 
explains, 
 
[All the Zionist parties] believed that the British Mandate over the Land of Israel must be 
maintained and that the creation of the new Jewish society will be the result of a gradual 
process … While the workers’ parties opined that with the help of the proletariat … it will be 
possible to develop voluntarily an autonomous society in the Land of Israel, the Revisionist 
movement stressed the importance of the British-Mandatory political factor: upon it lay the 
duty of forging political conditions … which will enable the Zionist movement to advance 
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1 Joseph Heller, ‘The Zionist Right and National Liberation: from Jabotinsky to Avraham Stern’, Israel Affairs 1:3 
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unhindered the process of immigration to the land and its construction, until the Jewish Yishuv 
becomes a majority.2 
 
Hence, the difference between the Labour and Revisionist Zionists was more of a tactical 
rather than strategic character: both treated Great Britain as an ally, though maintaining a 
balance of interests between it and the Yishuv was a wearisome task. When conflict arose 
between the Mandate and the Yishuv authorities, the latter usually chose diplomatic 
methods to push Britain to cooperate. Only when the Biltmore Platform, which defined 
explicitly the aim of Zionism as the establishment of a ‘Jewish commonwealth’ (a sovereign 
state, by any other name) in Palestine, was adopted in May 19423 did the Zionist 
leadership begin to move away from the idea of the Yishuv’s strategic dependence on 
Britain. By that time the Yishuv had grown in strength and numbers, and Hitler’s 
persecution of the Jews had furnished the Zionist leadership with a powerful argument for 
Jewish independence. Using diplomatic and warfare tactics, the State of Israel was created 
in 1948.   
Yet this narrative overlooks alternative standpoints on the Zionist-British relationship 
which rose within the ranks of the Revisionist movement back in the 1930s. They were 
enunciated chiefly in an informal circle of so-called ‘Maximalist Revisionists’. This group of 
radical right-wing activists, disappointed with what it perceived as a lack of sufficient 
protection and support by the British for the Yishuv (especially after the Arab-Jewish 
clashes of 1929), came to doubt Britain’s role as an ally. Their premise was based on two 
assumptions: that the Hebrew-speaking Yishuv in Palestine had become a native society, 
therefore deserving of self-determination instead of colonial protection; and that no actual 
alliance of interests existed between the Zionist movement and the British Empire. They 
insisted on presenting Britain with an ultimatum: either it would side wholeheartedly with 
the Zionist enterprise or the Yishuv would seek to replace the British Mandate with 
another protector (such as fascist Italy, to which the Maximalists were particularly 
sympathetic, as it represented a socio-political option close to their outlook) while 
simultaneously conducting a guerrilla war against it, modelled upon the Irish Sinn Féin. 
When the British Peel Commission, in 1937, recommended the creation of a Jewish state 
in a small part of Palestine (annexing the remainder of the territory to Transjordan and 
leaving the corridor leading from the Jaffa port to Jerusalem under British protection), 
the abolishment of the Mandate became for the first time a real option. With the British 
Empire questioning its own right and ability to rule Palestine, the Maximalists began 
drawing up detailed political plans for the day after the Mandate. Furthermore, they 
accused Zionist leadership (mainly Labour, but tacitly their own as well) of acting against 
the vital interests of the Jewish people and the Yishuv by clinging to the strategic alliance 
with the British Empire. The Maximalists approved of acts of terrorism directed at the 
                                                
2 Yehoshua Porat, Shelah veet beyado: Sipur Khayav shel Uriel Shelah (Yonatan Ratosh) (Tel Aviv: Makhbarot lesifrut, 
1989), 41. All translations from Hebrew, unless stated otherwise, are my own. See also Nathan Yalin-Mor, Lohamey 
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3 For the Biltmore Platform text, see http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/biltmore.html. For the 
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Journal of Israeli History: Politics, Society, Culture 15:3 (1994): 261-2, 264-5; Evyatar Friesel, ‘On the Myth of the 
Connection between the Holocaust and the Creation of Israel’, Israel Affairs 14:3 (2008): 449-50. 
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British and, having renounced democracy, they called for an overthrow by force of Haim 
Weitzman, the president of the World Zionist Organization.4 
By questioning the principal political paradigm of post-1922 Zionism, including that of 
their own Revisionist movement, the Maximalists came close to the limits of contemporary 
Zionist consensus; while most of them did not eventually break those limits, there were 
some who did. The aim of this article is to map out the process by which the Maximalist 
opposition to Zionist policy evolved in certain cases to oppose Zionist ideology. What was the 
point at which some Maximalists realized that the alliance with Britain was, for Zionism, 
not simply a temporary tactic but an essential ideological component? Finally, this article shall 
attempt to assess how Maximalists re-evaluated Zionism, and how their initial Zionist 
zealousness morphed into staunch anti-Zionism. 
In order to analyze this, I have chosen to concentrate on sources that are representative 
of the aforementioned transformation. This article will offer a study of several works by 
two prominent political thinkers of the Yishuv, whose thought was profoundly shaped by 
Maximalist Revisionism. One is Uriel Shelah, better known under the pseudonym 
Yonatan Ratosh (born Heilperin, 1908-1981), one of the most prominent 20th century 
Hebrew poets, and also the figure most closely associated with the anti-Zionist movement 
known as the ‘Young Hebrews’, but more often referred to as the ‘Canaanites’. The other 
is Israel Scheib (Eldad, 1910-1996), who is remembered for his renditions of Nietzsche’s 
works into Hebrew, and who also co-headed the LEHI (Lohamey Herut Israel, ‘Fighters 
for the freedom of Israel’5) underground movement from 1943. Beginning in the 1930s, 
both men expressed in the Revisionist press their dissatisfaction with the British rule, 
which later developed into a criticism of the entire Zionist movement and finally a 
rejection of the Zionist ideology, at least as it was professed by the contemporary Zionist 
leadership. It is the purpose of this article to follow their path from anti-Britishness to 
anti-Zionism, that is, to try and see how a particular political standpoint leads to a revision 
of basic values, by juxtaposing the two thinkers’ intellectual development. It will be shown 
that Yonatan Ratosh broke the confines of Zionism once he adopted a historiographic 
‘commemorative narrative’6 which contradicted the Zionist historiographic base and made 
the Zionist cultural-political platform untenable. Israel Eldad, contrary to Ratosh, would 
commit himself to a radical redefinition of the Zionist ideology without undermining its 
historico-philosophical base. Thus, whereas Ratosh eventually adopted an alternative 
national idea, which regarded Zionism as a foreign and hostile monolith, Eldad 
renegotiated Zionism to such extent that he excluded from its limits all trends and 
currents except his own. It will be demonstrated that these different intellectual starting 
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University Press, 1986), 28-30; Eran Kaplan, The Jewish Radical Right: Revisionist Zionism and its Ideological Legacy 
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(2013), 449-67; Dan Tamir, ‘Some Thoughts about Hebrew Fascism in Inter-War Palestine’, Zeitschrift für Religions- 
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5 In this context, ‘Israel’ refers not to the state, but to the entire Jewish nation, conceptualized, as we shall see 
below, in metahistorical terms. 
6 Yael Zerubavel defines ‘commemorative narrative’ as ‘a broader view of history, a basic “story line” that is 
culturally constructed and provides the group members with a general notion of their shared past’. Yael Zerubavel, 
Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition (Chicago, London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1995), 6. 
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points resulted in a development of diametrically opposed political positions in post-1948 
Israel. 
The works by Yonatan Ratosh scrutinized below are his series of articles published in 
1937 under the headline We Aspire to Power, while he was still a devout Zionist, and the 
essay ‘The Opening Discourse’, printed in 1944 as a manifest of his new anti-Zionist 
‘Canaanite’ stance. Eldad’s works analyzed below are his series of programmatic articles 
‘Foundation stones’, which he published while still active in the LEHI underground in 
1943, and several other pieces which he wrote after Israel’s foundation, including two 
interviews given shortly before his death in 1996. The comparative analysis of these works 
will allow us to measure the extent of both men’s intellectual transformation. It will be 
observed that while Ratosh changed his views profoundly over a short period of time, 
Eldad remained more consistent in his opinions from the 1940s to the 1990s, modifying 
them only slightly after the establishment of Israel. 
 
 
Yonatan Ratosh – from Maximalism to Hebrew Nationalism 
 
In order to adequately understand the transformation of Yonatan Ratosh from a radical 
Zionist to a radical anti-Zionist we must map the intellectual context in which he acted. 
Ratosh, who was involved since high-school with Revisionist activity, came soon under the 
influence of Maximalist Revisionists. They were especially appealing to him due to the fact 
that they used the Yishuv’s ostensible nativeness to legitimate anti-British agitation. As 
Ratosh explained in an autobiographic article: ‘Since my youth … I conceived the British 
as a foreign power, therefore entirely superfluous’, since ‘if … for the elderly who came 
from Eastern Europe the British rule was a progressive mandatory rule by the liberal and 
enlightened Great Britain, for me it was naturally a foreign rule’.7 Ratosh, who grew up in 
a Hebrew-speaking home in Warsaw and Odessa, and lived in Palestine from age 11, 
perceived the British presence in the eyes of a self-declared native, framing it within a 
wider question of his own identity as a Palestinian Hebrew/Jew. Thus, while for the 
Maximalist Revisionists the British presence in Palestine (and Zionist cooperation with it) 
was primarily a political-strategic issue, for Ratosh it was also a matter of native sentiment. 
Ratosh found himself attracted to Maximalism due to his belief that it expressed the 
‘true’ ideology of Jabotinskian Revisionism, which mainstream Revisionists avoided 
formulating explicitly due to tactical considerations. Yet disappointment soon followed: 
 
I remember well how I was healed from this illusion. It was in Jerusalem, at the end of the first 
week of April, 1934 … One of the Revisionist luminaries in the country [Palestine], a Russian 
intelligent, like most of the party’s leadership, wanted to have an article printed in the 
newspaper [Hayarden, which Ratosh co-edited] … He explained very eloquently that the 
‘Activists’ … were merely a marginal phenomenon, while the [Revisionist] Party line was 
actually the ‘Ten-Year Plan’. The Plan envisaged a demand from Britain to introduce a settler 
‘colonizing regime’ to facilitate through land allocation to Hebrew settlement and an 
encouraging taxation system the creation of a Jewish majority in the Land within a decade, and 
only then, at the end of the decade, when the hoped-for Hebrew majority will become reality in 
                                                
7 Yonatan Ratosh, ‘Hakdama’, in Yonatan Ratosh, Reshit Hayamim: Ptikhot ‘Ivriyot (Tel Aviv: Hadar, 1982), 8, 20 
(emphasis mine). 
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the Land, to grant it independence, as stipulated in the Mandate … I became convinced that 
his words … truly represented the line of the Party and its leader … I found [in this article] a 
corroboration of my growing doubts regarding this movement.8 
 
As James Diamond puts it, ‘Ratosh’s original suspicion of the entire Zionist enterprise now 
intensified: Revisionism, too, was part of what he saw as a collusion of European Diaspora 
Jews with European non-Jews to decide the fate of Palestinian Jews’.9 
However, the stormy political dynamic of the 1930s gave Ratosh an opportunity to 
agitate for his views still within the Revisionist movement. In early July 1937 the Peel 
Commission published its report, which Ratosh saw as a geopolitical turning point, both 
for Britain and for Zionism, since mandatory rule became contestable (by explicit 
admission of the British authorities themselves). From July to December 1937 he 
published a series of articles in Hayarden (reprinted the following year in an expanded 
version in a booklet titled We Aspire to Power10), in which he urged the Zionist movement to 
press for an immediate transfer of sovereignty over Palestine to the Yishuv, in accordance 
with the original principles of the Mandate and the Balfour Declaration. He argued that 
 
The National Movement [the Revisionists] must adopt the first rule of political Zionism as its 
basic primary rule. When the Balfour Declaration was delivered, Zangwill demanded that the 
rule should be transferred to the Jews at once. We must revert to this demand … We must 
claim it right now.11 
 
And furthermore: 
 
The Hebrew rule is the only rule which can implement the aims of the Mandate wholly and 
sincerely, [that is] to ease the Hebrew aliya and Hebrew settlement.12 
 
Yehoshua Porat explains that such a demand, ‘which indeed constituted a return to the 
notions promoted by Herzl, Nordau and Zangwill, had been abandoned by that time by 
the Revisionist movement, and currently seemed too strong and revolutionary in light of 
its present-day policy’.13 Ratosh, who was perfectly aware of this, dedicated a lot of space to 
a harsh criticism of the Revisionist movement, which for him became similar to Labour 
Zionism by legitimizing the British presence in Palestine. Ratosh argued that by adhering 
to diplomatic policy vis-à-vis the British, the Zionist leadership effectively gave up its claim 
to Palestine: 
 
The slogan of the [Zionist political] war is not freedom, but pressure for negotiations … We do 
not claim the chair [of King David, occupied by the foreigner]. We only ask that he who 
occupies it improves his rule, fulfils our wishes.14 
 
                                                
8 Ibid., 20-1. 
9 Diamond, Homeland or Holy Land?, 30. 
10  Reprinted in Ratosh, Reshit hayamim, 42-59. 
11  Ibid., 44-5. 
12  Ibid., 59. Note the usage of the adjective ‘Hebrew’, which Ratosh, still in accordance with the pre-1948 Zionist 
practice, applies indiscriminately to Palestine-born Hebrew-speakers and Jews immigrating to Palestine. 
13  Porat, Shelah veet beyado, 99. 
14  Ratosh, Reshit hayamim, 44. 
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We, who do not demand the power, but a foreign patronage … admit that we are not capable 
of ruling the Land.15 
 
[The Zionist movement] does not conclude that [the mandatory] regime is illegal and cannot 
solve the Jewish question, it does not want to replace it with a Zionist regime … It only asks 
from the present regime to replace its executors and to do what it refuses to do from its first 
day till today. The Zionist movement does not define the British administration in the Land of 
Israel as enemy; to the contrary, it sees in Britain the only faithful and desired ally.16 
 
Despite Ratosh’s dissatisfaction with both Zionist streams, his rhetoric still conformed to 
the Zionist paradigm, as he himself admitted in hindsight.17 The distinction that he makes 
between Jews and Hebrews is in accordance with Zionist principles (that is, a Hebrew 
means a ‘better’ Jew); he refers to the Diaspora as the potential rearguard for the Zionist 
thrust in Palestine; finally, he makes clear that the final end of his plan is to implement the 
Zionist objective and the Balfour Declaration. He does not rebel (yet) against the essence 
of Zionism, only against its leadership which supposedly betrayed its founding principles. 
Ratosh thus posits himself as the speaker of the younger Hebrew generation in Palestine, 
ready to deploy grassroots pressure upon the opportunist and weak-spirited ‘elders’. We 
can therefore define Ratosh’s 1937 standpoint as a ‘fundamentalist’ Zionism, calling for the 
return to the ideology’s core values.18 
Despite its overall adherence to Zionist orthodoxy, We Aspire to Power was subversive 
enough to cause consternation within the ranks of the Revisionist movement. The 
Revisionist youth, both in Palestine and abroad, is reported to have welcomed Ratosh’s 
booklet enthusiastically, but the Revisionist senior ranks treated Ratosh as an over-zealous 
nuisance. Ratosh attempted to advance his program at the convention of the (Revisionist) 
New Zionist Organization in Prague in early 1938, but his propositions were voted off the 
agenda (only the Polish delegate, Menachem Begin, and most of the Palestine delegation 
objected). Ratosh held two personal meetings with Zeev Jabotinsky, also to no avail. He 
later described Jabotinsky as ‘an old man … whose world was totally and fundamentally 
different from mine’,19 accusing him of ignorance in global geopolitics. Ratosh, like many 
other young Revisionists, was also indignant with Jabotinsky when he supported at the 
beginning of the Palestinian Arab Revolt in 1936 the ‘restraint’ policy promulgated by the 
Labour Zionist leadership. As a result, Ratosh wrote years later, he was removed from the 
editorial board of Hayarden,20 though Porat questions this particular claim. The latter 
shows that Ratosh continued to publish articles in this newspaper after 1937 and that there 
was no abrupt termination of his publications, but rather a gradual decline. Porat admits 
that he is unsure of the exact cause, but attributes it quite reasonably to Ratosh’s growing 
radicalization and remoteness from Zionism.21 
                                                
15  Ibid., 49. 
16  Ibid., 58. 
17  Ratosh, ‘Hakdama’, 15. See also editor’s footnote in Ratosh, Reshit hayamim, 42. 
18  For more on We Aspire to Power and its context, see Diamond, Homeland or Holy Land?, 31-3; Porat, Shelah veet 
beyado, 70-2, 85-9, 97-104, 108; Ratosh, ‘Hakdama’, 15-24. 
19  Ratosh, ‘Hakdama’, 16, 17. 
20  Ibid., 15. 
21  Porat, Shelah veet beyado, 103-18. 
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The relatively short time-span of 1938-1939, which Ratosh spent in Paris, is a key 
period in his intellectual formation, since it was then that he finally crossed the line 
between doubting Zionist politics to doubting Zionist ideology. He came to perceive the 
Revisionist movement as essentially identical with Labour Zionism (to which Ratosh 
admitted to have felt aversion since high-school), and the rejection of his propositions at 
the Prague convention, as Diamond sees it, ‘reinforced his perception that Zionism was as 
foreign an entity as the British’.22 Ratosh recalled that what he saw in Prague was ‘the 
[Revisionist movement] in its native habitat … – the Diaspora. For me it was a first direct 
contact with the Diaspora, which forced me to reevaluate my own Hebrew world’.23 
Having realized the depth of the abyss between his own Palestinian society (or its rather 
small section which used Hebrew on a daily basis and regarded itself as indigenous to the 
Land) and Diaspora Jewry, he drew a sharp socio-cultural distinction between the two, 
defining the former as a territorial-linguistic nation and the latter as a cosmopolitan faith-
community with no authentic aspiration for national sovereignty. In his last articles in 
Hayarden, Ratosh began advancing the idea that the current troubles of the Diaspora in the 
looming shade of Hitlerism should not bother the Revisionist movement; moreover, he 
began referring to the ‘Hebrew golden age’ before the emergence of monotheistic Judaism 
as the cultural foundation of Hebrew nationalism.24 
The adoption of these ideas should be attributed to Ratosh’s acquaintance with another 
ex-Revisionist, Adya Gur Horon (born Adolphe Gourevitch, 1907-1972), who, as a student 
of the ancient Near East and Semitic philology at the Sorbonne, took part in the 
deciphering of the Ugarit epic poetry discovered in Syria in 1929. This inspired him to 
portray the pagan Hebrews as empire- and civilization-builders in the ancient Levant and 
the Mediterranean, whose demise came as a result of the dissemination and adoption of 
Judaism. Horon thus formulated a historiography of the ancient Hebrews which radically 
differed from the standard Jewish-Zionist historiography, with its strong messianic 
elements and the stress on the Jewish Diaspora sufferings and longing for redemption.25 
Subsequently, Horon shared his historical findings with Ratosh, who used them to 
construct a new political ideology, one that would aspire to recreate the national values 
and potency of the Hebrew ‘golden age’ and discard the historical baggage of Judaism and 
Diaspora as essentially non-nationalist.26 When Ratosh returned from Paris to Palestine in 
September 1939, he arrived as a convert to anti-Zionism, espousing the ‘Canaanite’ 
ideology, which must be regarded as basically different from Zionism due to the dissimilar 
historiographic sources of both ideologies, since it should be argued that different visions 
of the past regarding a particular community would necessarily lead to a formulation of 
different visions of the future for the same community – in this case, the Yishuv. It can be 
argued furthermore that if Ratosh’s opposition to the Revisionist and Zionist leadership 
                                                
22  Diamond, Homeland or Holy Land?, 33. 
23  Porat, Shelah veet beyado, 114. See also Diamond, Homeland or Holy Land?, 32-3, 147 (n. 41); Porat, Shelah veet 
beyado, 80, 96-7, 103-14; Ratosh, ‘Hakdama’, 15-22. Ratosh mentions sardonically that most of the delegates at the 
Prague convention did not understand what he was actually saying, since he spoke Hebrew (ibid., 19). 
24  Porat, Shelah veet beyado, 111. 
25  For Horon’s historiography, see Adolphe G. Horon, ‘Canaan and the Aegean Sea: Greco-Phoenician Origins 
Reviewed’, Diogenes 58 (1967): 37-61; A. G. Horon, Eretz-Hakedem: Madrikh Histori umdini lamizrakh Hakarov (Tel Aviv: 
Hermon, 1970); A. G. Horon, Kedem vaerev: Knaan – Toldot Eretz ha’ivrim (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 2000). 
26 On Horon-Ratosh intellectual tandem of 1938-39, see Diamond, Homeland or Holy Land?, 34-8; Porat, Shelah veet 
beyado, 119-57; Ratosh, ‘Hakdama’, 12-15. On the ‘Canaanite’ idea in general, see Diamond, Homeland or Holy Land?; 
Klaus Hofmann, ‘Canaanism’, Middle Eastern Studies 47:2 (March 2011): 273-94. 
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before his acquaintance with Horon was limited to a political disagreement, his post-1939 
anti-Zionism was grounded in a strong intellectual base. 
The most detailed exposure of the tenets of ‘Canaanism’ is the 1944 manifesto ‘The 
Opening Discourse’.27 Diamond is only slightly exaggerating when describing it as ‘one of 
the most remarkable and important documents of Jewish intellectual history in [the 20th] 
century’,28 though the adjective Jewish is highly doubtful methodologically, since at the 
core of ‘Canaanism’ lies a firm dichotomy between Jews as an ethno-denomination and 
Hebrews as a nation, and Ratosh surely would have been seriously offended if he had been 
called a Jewish intellectual.29 ‘The Opening Discourse’ lays bare the way which Ratosh 
went from ‘fundamentalist’ Zionism to all-out rejection of Zionism as a Jewish ideology 
formed in the Diaspora and hostile to the Hebrew nation-creation which he believed was 
taking place in Palestine as a non-Jewish phenomenon. By the time Ratosh wrote ‘The 
Opening Discourse’ he came to regard Zionism as a Jewish imitation of Gentile nationalism: 
 
The Zionists were Jews who went out to the culture of the Gentiles because of an inability to 
find satisfaction in Judaism, but not because of the ability or the desire to take leave of it. Or 
perhaps they did seek to leave it but couldn’t overcome the obstacles in doing so. So they 
sought to define Judaism for their purposes as a polity, as a nation among the nations in which 
they lived, in a world that is based on the principle of nationalism, as a … substitute … for the 
nationalism of the Gentiles which they found lacking in themselves; in other words [the Jewish 
Zionists were] bereft of any grounding in society, uprooted in a world of nations. Zionism from 
the outset came into being as a substitute for this need. It was created out of a vacuum, in the 
emptiness of the Jewish heart, in order to fill it with a substitute, in order to provide the 
possibility to continue to live as a Jew among the Gentiles.30 
 
Ratosh lists the founding principles of Zionism: 1) the Jews are a people, 2) that desires the 
Land of Israel as its homeland, 3) and for that aim have set up a movement of national 
liberation 4) which has caused the Jewish settlement in Palestine, thereby solving the 
‘Jewish question’,31 and then proceeds to refute them one by one: 
 
The Jews are not a nation and never were. They are not a nation but a faith-community 
[literally, ‘edah] whose existence is in the Dispersion and whose homeland is the Dispersion. 
This Jewish faith-community has a Holy Land as do many faith-communities. But it has no 
homeland, nor does it need one, nor does it want one, neither this land nor any other land. A 
faith-community by its very nature does not have the capacity to establish a national liberation 
movement … Zionism, as a Jewish phenomenon, as a phenomenon within a faith-community, 
can absolutely never, from its beginning to any form it will assume in the future, be a 
movement of national liberation or a national movement at all … The Hebrews in Palestine are 
in no way the direct result of Zionism.32 
 
                                                
27  Reprinted in Ratosh, Reshit hayamim, 149-203. 
28  Diamond, Homeland or Holy Land?, 51. 
29  It is not the author’s intention to imply that we should accept ‘Canaanite’ assertions at face value, only to 
suggest that the uncritical annexation of ‘Canaanism’ to Jewish intellectual history betrays insensitivity to its basic 
principles. 
30  Ratosh, Reshit hayamim, 179, cited in Diamond, Homeland or Holy Land?, 72-3. 
31  Ratosh, Reshit hayamim, 176; Diamond, Homeland or Holy Land?, 55. 
32  Ratosh, Reshit hayamim, 178, cited in Diamond, Homeland or Holy Land?, 56. 
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We can infer from the above some of ‘Canaanism’s’ central assumptions: that Zionism, 
which the ‘Canaanites’ regarded as a surrogate for the community-forging function 
previously performed by Judaism, was inherently false and therefore anything it 
endeavoured in Palestine, even if helpful in the short-term, was inevitably ‘ill from the 
start’;33 that Zionism was part and parcel of Jewish history, being a continuation rather 
than a break with it;34 that it was inimically hostile to the Hebrew national consolidation 
and therefore must be fought against; that nation and faith-community were opposites, 
since ‘family and nation, biology and sociology, are two entirely different essences’;35 
finally, that the determinist law of history was that the [Hebrew] nation must supersede 
the [Jewish] denomination, since in the modern world communities give way to nations.36 
By identifying Zionism with Diaspora Judaism, Ratosh essentially turns the Zionist weapon 
(its anti-Diaspora rhetoric, the so-called ‘shlilat hagalut’, or ‘the negation of Exile’) against 
Zionism itself. 
What is particularly interesting is that in ‘The Opening Discourse’ Ratosh abandons 
almost entirely his We Aspire to Power theses. Though he mentions ‘the eternal Jew 
Vladimir Jabotinsky’ who opposed an armed retaliation to the Arab Rebellion in 1936,37 he 
makes no call for the expulsion of the British and does not demand the immediate 
establishment of a Hebrew state. Moreover, he accuses the anti-British underground 
organizations such as the ETZEL (the Revisionist-associated ‘Irgun Tzvai Leumi’, the 
‘National Military Organization’, whose supreme commander was Jabotinsky) or the LEHI 
of being ‘an opposition preserving the existing order’.38 Porat regards this as a severe 
weakness of the ‘Canaanite’ founding manifest and remarks that some contemporaries 
even believed Ratosh had become a British agent (nothing could be farther from the truth, 
of course), but he observes that at this stage Ratosh saw no sense in an armed struggle 
against the British under Zionist banners39  (‘The Opening Discourse’ makes several 
sarcastic references, in Ratosh’s idiosyncratic style, to the Jewish underground 
organizations, whose activity, ironically, was partly inspired by Ratosh’s own We Aspire to 
Power40). ‘The Opening Discourse’ is above all a piece of ideological education; Ratosh 
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believed that only when the Hebrew youth in Palestine is won over to ‘Canaanism’, not 
only the British but also the Zionists will be defeated.41 This redefinition of priorities 
regarding the chief enemy’s identity is therefore perfectly plausible: having realized that 
his main front will be against the Zionists, the British became of secondary importance for 
Ratosh. Many years later he admitted to holding a grudge against them for having 
occupied so much of his time and intellectual effort.42 
 
 
Israel Eldad – from Maximalism to Redemption 
 
Since Israel Eldad grew to be LEHI’s foremost intellectual, we must examine his writings 
in order to assess to what extent LEHI was an ‘anti-Zionist’ movement. In 1941 Avraham 
Stern, the movement’s founder, declared that Zionism, incapable to oppose the British 
mandatory power and unable to save European Jews from Hitler, had rendered itself 
obsolete and must clear the stage for a genuine Hebrew liberation movement, which, as 
Yalin-Mor interprets it, should become an ‘anti-thesis’ for Zionism.43 Ratosh’s influence on 
Stern is readily observable here, as well as on Eldad, though it seems to be limited to his 
pre-‘Canaanite’ stage, as the following words by Eldad, published in 1943, testify: 
 
The Balfour Declaration and the Mandate are unlawful documents, both legally and morally, 
but above all because we, the sole owners of this land, reject the legitimacy of these documents 
… This is the legal, moral, just situation. The factual situation is that the Land of Israel is being 
forcibly ruled by a foreign occupant … We do not acknowledge their declarations and their 
mandates, neither do we look for better mandators nor do we inquire into the implementation 
of particular paragraphs.44 
 
Until now Zionism has acknowledged England’s right to rule here, ‘consecrated’ either by the 
‘Declaration’ or the ‘Mandate’ … He who restricts himself to a war against the ‘White Paper’ 
admits England’s general right to be the lord here. He who opposes a particular law 
acknowledges the lawgiver’s principal right to legislate, asking only for a better law. We reject 
this right … He who thinks that he can defeat the occupant by new settlements – let him build 
new settlements. He who thinks that he will manage by congress resolutions – let him do so. We 
                                                
fighters” [LEHI] cherish the names of the excellent fathers in the lauded ghetto and put out leaflets strumming on 
Jewish strings … yet after all of this, and with all of this, following our first publication, they will make sure to put in 
their brochures Hebrew where they mean Jew and title their leaflets Hebrews in the homeland, as if there can be 
Hebrews elsewhere, - we shall know then and shall announce that these people are lying to themselves, to us, and to 
the whole Hebrew youth’ (ibid., 170 [emphases in the original]). 
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Yehudit balashon haivrit: Ptikhot bevikoret uviv’ayot halashon (Tel Aviv: Hadar, 1982), 178. 
42  Ratosh, ‘Hakdama’, 8, 30. 
43  Yalin-Mor, Lohamey Herut Israel, 76. Similarly, Yalin-Mor stated in a LEHI underground publication that the 
‘Hebrew freedom movement’ was not identical to Zionism, which was ‘an ambiguous creature – between the 
occupant and a liberation movement … [including] both Weitzman and Jabotinsky’ (ibid., 126). 
44 Israel Eldad, ‘Avnei Yesod’, in Tziyonut: Pulmus ben Zmanenu – Gishot Mekhkariyot veideologiyot, eds. Avi Bareli and 
Pinchas Ginossar (Sde Boker: Ben-Gurion University, 1996), 458. 
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do not believe in this. We believe that settlements and congresses can be helpful for the war, but 
the war is essentially different … to demonstrate that the ruler here is the occupant and treat him 
as an occupant.45 
 
We can see in this passage that Eldad moves quite smoothly from anti-British rhetoric to 
an attack on the Zionist establishment. Although he accepted in an interview given late in 
life the assessment of the LEHI as a non-Zionist movement,46 Eldad hastened to refine it 
according to his own particular conception of Zionism. Unlike Ratosh after 1939, Eldad 
did not question the fundamentals of Zionism; rather, he conceptualized them according 
to his own particular philosophy of history, which differed enough from the customary 
Zionist interpretation of Jewish history to warrant him the title of ‘anti-Zionist’, as long as 
the Zionist movement was dominated by its mainstream, whether of the Labour or the 
Revisionist kind. 
Eldad saw Zionism as primarily a messianic movement, of which the historical purpose 
was to bring redemption to the Jewish people by gathering all the exiles in a ‘Kingdom of 
Israel’ located within the biblical borders of the Promised Land. Eldad’s political 
messianism employs mundane tools to achieve political ends that are then bestowed with a 
metaphysical and metahistorical quality. His Messiah is not a personal agent of redemption 
but a historically determined teleology: ‘if we speak here of a Jewish messianic vision, we 
do not refer to its … Jewish distortion as a vision of universal redemption but to its plain 
meaning as the Nation’s Redemption in the Kingdom of the House of David … the vision 
of redemption is a realistic process with the help of heavens’.47 Eldad therefore redefines 
Judaism to suit his perception of its ‘actual’ essence48 and subscribes to a deterministic 
philosophy of history which represents what he believes to be the ‘stable’ laws of Jewish 
history: 
 
The law of the Jewish history is … the law of stately greatness which will accompany the redemption. 
The justification for this stately greatness is the spiritual power and the internal spiritual 
religious and moral purpose which will require [the establishment of] the material Kingdom of 
Israel … that will stretch from the Euphrates to the Nile spelling awe all over the peoples 
around and being materially rich … This is the law of our history, being the only alternative for 
the dispersion which is punishment and disaster.49 
 
With respect to the Diaspora, Eldad has merely the following to say: ‘Jew-hatred is the law, 
the desire to obliterate the Jewish people is the ever-standing desire in all countries, faiths, 
peoples and regimes … any golden age of Jewish equality in any of the Diaspora countries 
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is but … the exception confirming the rule’.50 Zionism according to Eldad is a movement 
springing from these two complementary laws of Jewish history, whose dialectic will result 
in the Absolute, the messianic Kingdom of Israel: 
 
The dynamic combination of the three following revolutions: a) the evacuation of the entire 
Diaspora and the return to the Land of Israel of the entire Jewish people, which is one people by 
will or by force, by consciousness or by compulsion, by own decision or by the decision of the 
Gentiles; b) the liberation of the entire Land of Israel in the borders of the godly promise which 
are its geopolitical boundaries, from the Euphrates to the Nile; c) the return by renewal and 
renaissance to the basic values of Judaism … these three we call the Kingdom of Israel.51 
 
Eldad’s Zionism belongs therefore to the ‘fundamentalist’ variety. By this he reminds us 
again of pre-1939 Ratosh, with one significant difference: the latter, though also a firm 
believer in historical determinism, viewed it through strictly secular-materialist lenses. 
Moreover, Eldad is not content with a mere return to the ‘original’ Zionism: as we shall 
see, he wants to transgress Zionism in order to realize what can only be described as an 
ultra-Zionist theo-political vision. 
Understandably, any aspect of Jewish politics which does not conform to Eldad’s 
deterministic philosophy of history is denounced by him as a treachery of the Jewish 
purpose (in Eldad’s words: ‘Satan dresses up in many ways. Sometimes he even pretends 
to be a Zionist or a Zionist leader or an Israeli minister’52). Eldad basically wishes to defend 
his image of Herzlian Zionism from Herzl’s ‘unworthy’ successors, thus excluding from 
‘true’ Zionism the entire institutional Zionist movement, leaving only the LEHI as the 
single power striving to realize the Zionist-Messianic vision of Gathering the Exiles in the 
Kingdom of Israel. In his series of articles ‘Foundation stones’, published in 1943, while 
still in the underground, Eldad mounts a fierce attack not only on the policy of the Labour 
and Revisionist Zionism, but also on their basic principles, calling for a creation of a 
‘liberation movement on new foundations’.53 He writes off the preceding four decades of 
Zionism, accusing it of philanthropic inclinations to solve the universal ‘Jewish problem’ 
instead of serving the positive-internal impulse of the Jews to regain their homeland and 
establish a kingdom there, which would usher in the messianic age. ‘Zionism turned from 
messianic yearnings for a Davidic kingdom to a refugee question’,54 which, as Eldad notes, 
can be solved more effectively elsewhere than in the Land of Israel (though only 
temporarily due to the ‘iron law of the Diaspora’ cited above). By making Zionist secular-
political aims a purpose in itself rather than using them as tools supporting the drive 
towards the Eldadian concept of redemption, that is, choosing the ‘negative’ motivation 
over the ‘positive’ one, the Zionist movement, Eldad continues, committed two fatal errors: 
it looked constantly to excuse itself as a servant of humanitarian ends, thus reneging on its 
national-sovereign nature;55 by treating the Land of Israel as simply the best place to solve 
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the global ‘Jewish problem’, Zionism broke its commitment to it as the Jews’ homeland and 
domain of their kingdom. In effect, Eldad argues, the Zionist movement adopted a 
‘colonizing’ approach to the Land, which pushed it into an unholy alliance with the British 
(and when the moment came to confront Britain in the 1930s, Eldad adds, the Zionist 
leadership refused to fulfil its historical role and fatally delayed the emergence of Israel, 
allowing the destruction of the European Jewry by Hitler).56 Contravening the Hegelian 
logic of Jewish history formulated by Eldad, the Zionist movement made itself illegitimate; 
hence his call for a new liberation movement, of which the LEHI, it must be assumed, will 
be the core. This is how Eldad sums up his alternative view of Zionism: 
 
The formulation of the aim of Zionism should have expressed the nation’s plain and positive 
wish: the renewal of the Kingdom of Israel. Any other argumentation weakens the matter and lays it 
to rest. This is the nation’s will. A solution to a problem, anti-Semitism, emigration, etc., all 
these are side-questions which may be helpful tactically, but the initial declaration from the very 
first moment should have been clear, like the Frenchman who does not need to base his 
demand for France on a ‘French problem’, but on the sovereign will of the French nation. Our 
dispersal argument was turned upside down. The truth is: not because we are dispersed we 
want the state but in spite of our dispersal we desire it … We wish and we fight for a Kingdom 
whether there is anti-Semitism or not, whether there is a problem or not, whether there are 
refugees or not.57 
 
What do the Poles, the French, the Greeks fight for? To solve the Polish, Greek, French 
problem? No! They fight for the liberation of their homeland and its independence as a self-
sufficient cultural aim and not because it would solve any problem. Thus, and not otherwise, we 
ought to have presented the question. Not an establishment of a safe haven, but the liberation 
of the homeland. Not a solution to the problem of the people, but to the problem of the land.58 
 
The principles which ‘political Zionism’ and ‘practical Zionism’ subscribed to were two: the 
Hebrew people as an object, an international problem. The Land of Israel as a country to be 
colonized, and these two were behind Zionism’s failure.59 
 
We are convinced that a major cause for the lack of Zionist success must be attributed to the fact 
that it touched only the shell. [It did not touch] the deepest string in the Jewish soul, the 
messianic string … Therefore it became a movement of colonization, of funds and statistics.60 
 
Consequently, Eldad argues, the Zionist movement adopted values at odds with the Jewish 
messianic imperative, like ‘normalization’ and ‘productivization’, which for him are an 
expression of the Diasporic desire to assimilate, that is, to ‘become a people like all 
peoples’. Likewise, Zionists accepted the international community’s diplomatic rules 
instead of forcing upon it rules of their own, and adopted liberal-parliamentarian methods 
of managing their politics (which Eldad ridicules as ‘mathematical Zionism’), as if the core 
values of Judaism could be put to vote. His conclusion is that secular Zionism sowed the 
seeds of its own destruction by turning away from Jewish religious values. This legitimized 
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possible de-Zionisation (once a contradiction between democratic values and Jewish 
nationalism is apprehended) leading to the eventual disestablishment of the state of 
Israel.61 Eldad accordingly declares that 
 
There are values which can never be measured mathematically; … We shall not go to elections, 
shall not conduct voting, shall not ask the majority. We deal not with atoms. We represent the 
most vital power of the people, we represent the loftiest cultural and national urge, which is to 
create a kingdom worthy of a nation like our own … We express the best national yearnings, 
the desire for the Messiah which is a redemption from exile, but much more than that, more 
positive, more cultural. And we do not ask the assimilated rabbi in America and the 
‘progressive’ from Hashomer Hatzair [a youth socialist-Zionist movement] here in the land 
whether he wants the Kingdom of Israel or not, like Spartacus who did not ask the slaves, like 
Piłsudski who did not ask, like De-Gaulle who does not ask.62 
 
We can discern in Eldad’s rhetoric the cult of the chosen few, who ‘drag’ the nation to the 
fulfilment of its historic purpose, despite the indifference or the hostility of the many. The 
national avant-garde, though numerically a minority is in fact a majority in the eyes of 
history, Eldad explains, since it is conscious of history’s immanent rules. Moreover, 
unwillingness to ‘push’ the majority to redemption due to democratic considerations is 
condemned by Eldad as a crime against nation and history.63 
After 1948 Eldad transferred his anti-democratic principles to the state of Israel. 
Regarding the state as an incomplete fulfilment of the redemptory purpose, he could not 
agree to parliamentary democracy which, at least potentially, could vote away the finite 
Zionist goal of establishing the Kingdom of Israel in biblical borders. And indeed Eldad 
stated openly that ‘democracy must be limited by Zionism’64 and expressed his ire with 
Israeli leaders who refused to speak ‘the truth’ about Israeli desire for territorial 
expansion (which was paradoxically left to be ‘unmasked’ by Israel’s Arab enemies) and 
accepted the legitimacy of the existing neighbouring Arab states.65 
Eldad stressed that the existence of Israel in its 1948 borders is acceptable only 
inasmuch as it serves as a tool or a ‘beachhead’ for the establishment of the Jewish 
messianic Kingdom; therefore, if Israeli policy is concentrated on maintaining the state for 
its own purpose, it will be illegitimate and the state will become unviable. As long as the 
Kingdom has not come into existence the purpose of Zionism according to Eldad has not 
been accomplished, hence the post-1948 and even post-1967 boundaries can be only 
temporary, since to accede to them would violate the determinist laws of Jewish history. 
For Eldad the state of Israel is not synonymous with the Land of Israel, thus, the aspiration 
to make the two one by stretching the State all over the Land is the long-term goal of 
Eldad’s ultra-Zionism, which transgresses the ‘limited’ and therefore unsustainable ends of 
non-messianic Zionism: ‘If there is a place for disappointment … it is from Zionism … 
which did not realize its responsibility for what is due to happen in the Diaspora on the 
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one hand and the power stored in the people on the other hand. And I do not refer here 
to the past only, but to the present and the future as well’.66 
In considering Zionism a kind of ‘never-ending story’ Eldad showed himself to be 
largely still a disciple of Zeev Jabotinsky. Jabotinsky promulgated the idea of ‘monism’, 
whereby the period leading up to the establishment of the Jewish state must not suffer 
from any ideological and political ambivalence or duality (condemning the mixture of 
socialism and Zionism practiced by the Labour Zionist camp); rather, all efforts, 
intellectual, political and diplomatic, must be bent on the attainment of a Jewish majority 
in Palestine as a precondition for the establishment of a Jewish state by democratic means. 
Once the state is established, Jabotinsky continued, there will be room for various 
experiments to forge the best social system for the sovereign Jewish people.67 
Eldad raised Jabotinsky’s principle of monism to a higher level by asserting that as long 
as the Kingdom of Israel is not established, the monist discipline must be strictly observed, 
despite the existence of a sovereign Israel. Therefore, Israel’s socio-political structure is 
conditioned upon its adherence to Jewish historical determinism, making ‘secondary ideas 
such as issues of regime … democracy or acknowledgment of the Arabs’ equality (and each 
of them is a value per se and I do not negate them)’68 shifting values. Eldad explains further: 
‘inasmuch as this regime and this state create the conditions, or the springing board, or 
the beachhead for the realization of the vision, which is a historical and national necessity, 
they shall be deemed good; … [A true Jewish leadership] must declare as the highest 
priority of the state of Israel the Redemption and the Messianic Vision … A state of Israel 
which does not succumb to this law as its supreme law and shall not subordinate all other 
interests to this supreme aim will be an illegal state both religiously and historically’.69 For 
this purpose a revolution must take place, which would sweep away the leadership 
unfaithful to the laws of Jewish historical dialectics and bring to power a new ultra-Zionist 
leadership with an articulated consciousness of its historical role and duty. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have reviewed two cases of gradual radicalization within the Zionist movement 
motivated by the growing tension between the Zionist leadership and the British Mandate 
authorities in the 1930s-1940s. The path chosen by Yonatan Ratosh and Israel Eldad led 
from ‘fundamentalist’ Zionism to an opposition to the British presence in Palestine and the 
demand for its termination, to a dissatisfaction with the Zionist leadership which did not 
accede to this demand, and finally, to a rejection of Zionism once the Zionist policy at the 
time was redefined as inherent to Zionist ideology. With a new adversary identified, the 
British became a secondary element for Ratosh and Eldad. 
Despite their shared background and line of thought, there remained a significant 
difference between the two, which resulted in the emergence of two hostile camps on the 
margins of Israeli political life: the staunchly nationalist-secular ‘Canaanism’ which 
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adopted many leftist elements on the one hand, and the religious-messianic Zionism on 
the other hand, represented by the right-wing Bloc of the Faithful (‘Gush Emunim’) 
movement since the 1970s. While Ratosh derided Eldad’s post-1948 periodic Sulam as a 
‘Jewish study-house’,70 Eldad called his ideology a ‘futile chatter of assimilated Canaanites 
and “Israelis” … who create an “Israeli” ideology of separation from the Jewish people’,71 
insisting that ‘a “Diasporic” Jew living in the Land and obeying all his religious duties is 
much more Israeli than a “Sabra” imitating a Parisian drawing, an American actress or a 
Russian poem’.72 
It is this article’s contention that this difference originates in the intellectually distinct 
paths of Ratosh’s and Eldad’s development. Ratosh broke with Zionism when he adopted 
Horon’s historiography which contradicted the Jewish one (transposed to Zionism nearly 
unscathed, only that the mythical figure of the Messiah was substituted by a human agent), 
and used it to construct a national-liberal ideology which opposed Zionism due to what it 
perceived as its primordial and illiberal characteristics. Having denied the Jews the right 
for national self-determination, the ‘Canaanites’ declared themselves to be speaking in the 
name of an entirely different Hebrew nation, which was conceived in a liberal-secular 
framework with no racial undertones. The ‘Canaanites’ were not busy with rethinking 
Zionism; they rejected it out of hand as an ‘impostor’ of a ‘true’ nationalism (though not 
denying their own Zionist past73). 
Contrariwise, Israel Eldad, who did not doubt Jewish-Zionist historiography, remained 
essentially a Zionist. His novelty lay elsewhere: in a radical re-conceptualization of Zionism 
in messianic Hegelian terms. As a result, he denied the validity of the entire Zionist 
movement, except for the LEHI and the Bloc of the Faithful, since only these were 
‘obedient’ to his deterministic laws of Jewish history.74 Hence, Eldad’s fierce opposition to 
what he titled ‘Zionism’ was not directed at the ideology in total (in the fashion of Ratosh), 
but only at the guiding principles of secular Zionism. This is why Eldad’s transformation is 
a transition from ‘fundamentalist’ Zionism to ‘ultra-Zionism’. Ultimately, it would seem 
that Ratosh pursued a longer and much bolder way than Eldad, paying a higher price, 
politically as well as personally, remaining an outcast in Israeli literature and politics 
almost till the end of his life. 
The difference between the two thinkers is evident even when they use similar 
arguments against Zionism. We have seen above that both identified Zionism with 
Judaism; however, whereas for Ratosh this was Zionism’s source of weakness, for Eldad it 
was the potential source of its strength. And whereas Ratosh accused Zionism of upholding 
‘anti-national’ Jewish values, Eldad accused it of the opposite – of abandoning the ‘eternal’ 
and ‘essential’ Jewish national aim of working for messianic redemption. Finally, using the 
‘Hebrew’ denominator, Ratosh and Eldad invested in it different meanings: when Ratosh 
spoke of a ‘Hebrew nation’ he meant an autochthonous territorial-linguistic nation whose 
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bonds to the Jews were to be exclusively genetic, but not social or cultural;75 Eldad, 
conversely, wrote of the ‘Hebrew revolution’ as of the creation of a ‘new Jew’, that is, in an 
essentially Zionist way. 
We must not, however, identify indiscriminately the views expressed by Ratosh and 
Eldad with the platforms of the movements they led. Both the ‘Canaanites’ and the LEHI 
were complex phenomena which contained manifold strands of thought, and their 
ideology and politics converged at several points. Ratosh’s 1938 booklet We Aspire to Power 
was one of the impulses for the emergence of the LEHI in 1940,76 though its founder 
Avraham Stern rejected Ratosh’s views regarding Judaism and Jewish heritage and framed 
his struggle in Jewish-messianic terms.77 When Ratosh adopted ‘Canaanism’, the breach 
between him and the LEHI grew deeper, as is evidenced by Ratosh’s derisive references to 
the LEHI in ‘The Opening Discourse’. However, Joseph Heller reminds us that after 1944 
a pro-Soviet wing grew in significance within the LEHI, which resulted in a 
marginalization of the messianic Stern-Eldad tendency and a renewed growth in the pro-
‘Canaanite’ tendencies. 78  Besides this principal affinity, the two groups also mixed 
personally, since some prominent ‘Canaanites’ joined the LEHI, attracted by its anti-
British radicalism, opposition to Zionist mainstream and subscription to the idea of 
cultural and political primacy of Palestinian Hebrews over the Diaspora Jews (that is, the 
‘positive’ aspect of Zionism). One of the LEHI ‘Canaanites’ was Eliyahu Beth-Tzuri, who 
was hanged in Cairo in 1945 for his part in the assassination of the British minister of state 
in the Near East, Lord Moyne. He delivered at his process a fiery ‘Canaanite’ speech, 
declaring that ‘my ideas are not Zionist ideas. We don’t fight to uphold the Balfour 
Declaration. We don’t fight for the sake of the National Home. We fight for our freedom. 
In our country a foreign power rules’. 79  Beth-Tzuri, however, was dissatisfied with 
Ratosh’s intellectualism and his reluctance to face the British as long as the Hebrew youth 
                                                
75  It is important to realize that the ‘Canaanites’ did not deny that they hailed from the Jews, whom they 
considered a mixed array of communities of various ethnic origins united only by religious tradition (for the 
‘Canaanite’ version of the emergence of Judaism and Jews, see Horon, Kedem vaerev, 329-45), but refused to accede 
for the application of pre-modern criteria of identity to the modern Hebrew nation, which in their opinion Zionism 
aimed at. Hence the declaration by Ratosh’s youngest brother Uzzi Ornan (a professor of linguistics at the Technion) 
that ‘my father was a Jew, but I am not; there is no contradiction here’. ‘Anakhnu Knaanim: Sikhot im Prof. Uzzi 
Ornan’, Svivot (December 1994), 66. For more on Ratosh’s concept of nation-formation, see Yonatan Ratosh, 
‘Huledet haumma’, in Ratosh, Reshit hayamim, 38-41. 
76  This is confirmed also by LEHI co-leaders Nathan Yalin-Mor (Yalin-Mor, Lohamey Herut Israel, 56, 60) and 
Yitzhak Shamir (Porat, Shelah veet beyado, 104-5). 
77  For more on Ratosh-Stern relations, see Heller, ‘The Zionist Right and National Liberation’, 93; Porat, Shelah 
veet beyado, 204-23. 
78  Heller, ‘The Zionist Right and National Liberation’, 88, 104-5. On the ‘leftist’ tendency in the LEHI that 
advocated relying on the USSR in an anti-imperialist struggle in which the Arabs of Palestine and the entire Middle 
East could partake (and which went as far as incorporating some Marxist principles into the LEHI ideology), see 
Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, ‘A Cold War Casualty in Jerusalem, 1948: The Assassination of Witold Hulanicki’, 
Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs 4:3 (2010): 135-56; Yalin-Mor, Lohamey Herut Israel, 170, 180-1, 344-55, 381-95, 407-8, 
412-3, 419-33, 438-9, 457-61. We must keep in mind, however, that there is no principal parallel between 
‘Canaanism’ and a pro-Soviet stance. The pro-Soviet LEHI members were attracted to ‘Canaanism’ due to its 
national-liberation tones, and not due to its (nonexistent) socialist inclinations. Yalin-Mor, who came to head the 
pro-Soviet LEHI wing, had severe reservations regarding the ‘Canaanite’ ideology, though he admits that in many 
respects he could not but agree with it (ibid., 146-7).  
79 Cited in Diamond, Homeland or Holy Land?, 150, n. 77. See also Porat, Shelah veet beyado, 222; Yalin-Mor, Lohamey 
Herut Israel, 147, 191, 210-26, 248-59; and the booklet Hahitnakshut baLord Moyne (Tel Aviv: Hamidrasha haleumit, 
1975), which was published on the occasion of Beth-Tzuri’s (and his fellow assassin, Eliyahu Hakim’s) reburial in 
Israel by the heirs of the rightist LEHI wing, who were apparently troubled by Beth-Tzuri’s anti-Zionism and 
atheism and tried to play it down. 
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was held ‘captive’ by the Zionist ideology, stating ‘I am with you in all respects, but bombs 
should be thrown as well’.80 
To sum up, ‘Canaanism’ and Eldad’s messianism ultimately represented entirely different, 
and even contradictory, national visions: one Hebrew anti-Zionist, the other Jewish ultra-
Zionist. One might argue that ‘Canaanism’s’ liberal nationalism combined with opposition 
to Zionism gave rise to the post-Zionist standpoint which became popular in Israel since 
the late 1980s81 and which Eldad wholeheartedly despised.82 His own ideology was illiberal 
to the core, mixing perennialist conceptions of national identity (the Jewish people as 
eternal and unchangeable), religious radicalism and a cult of the soil.83  This latter 
characteristic, curiously, brought some observers of the Israeli public life to term the Bloc 
of the Faithful ideology ‘Messianic neo-Canaanism’,84 assuming (somewhat short-sightedly) 
that at the core of ‘Canaanism’ lay the land and not the nation. However, what the 
comparative analysis of ‘Ratoshism’ and ‘Eldadism’ shows above all is that Israeli anti-
Zionism can assume at times an extreme nationalist shape. 
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